🤖 AI Summary
タイトル：Windowsバックドア「Sleepwalker」は魔術パケットにより起動され、メモリに潜んで指令を待つ
要点：
1. バックドア「Sleepwalker」は特定のネットワークパケット（「魔術パケット」）で起動し、それが到着するまで静かにメモリに潜んでいる。
2. 対象となるパケットには、バックドア独自の指令言語で書かれた短いプログラムが含まれる。
3. 指令言語は23インストラクションで構成されており、コードを直接メモリ上で実行したり、データを移動したりできるなど機能が豊富。
4. 対象となるホストアドレスとしてVMwareのVMCI（Virtual Machine Communication Interface）が使用できることも特徴的。
5. バックドアは64ビットWindows DLLファイル内に隠され、Microsoftのdpapi.dllを模倣している。実際のdpapisvc.dllへのリダイレクトを試みるなど、高度な脱皮技術を持つ。
詳細：
- 通常バックドアはコマンド＆コントロールサーバーと通信し始めるが、「Sleepwalker」はネットワークトラフィックに潜んで特定のパターンを見つける。
- テクニカル分析では、感染されたまま外部に接続を行わないため、一般的なセキュリティツールには見つからない可能性があることが指摘されている。
"The Register has a story about a Windows backdoor that waits silently in memory for a 'magic packet' before springing into action," writes Slashdot reader fred133. "No outgoing traffic, just waiting..." From the report: Like a sleeper cell awaiting activation, a never-before-seen Windows backdoor dubbed Sleepwalker waits silently in memory for one specifically crafted network packet to wake it up and deliver commands using the malware's 23-instruction language. The commands can do everything from running code directly in memory to moving data off the computer. Malware researcher Dominik Reichel discovered the passive backdoor, which also has its own command language, and detailed Sleepwalker in a technical analysis on Monday. "What makes it worth writing up is what that packet carries: not a readable command, but a short program written in a command language of the backdoor's own design," Reichel said. "Its 23 instructions cover scheduling, several ways to move data, staged file delivery and running code directly in memory. Recovering the encryption key is not enough to understand one of these programs. The internal command language must be reverse engineered as well."
In addition to having its own command language, it's also notable that the remote host can be a VMware VMCI target instead of a normal network address. "Taken as a whole, the approach here is consistent with a targeted, well-resourced operation rather than an opportunistic one," Reichel wrote. The malware, hidden inside a 64-bit Windows DLL file, impersonates Microsoft's dpapi.dll, part of Windows' data protection API for protecting sensitive data. It exports the same seven functions as the real dpapi.dll, but attempts to forward calls to a file named dpapisvc.dll, which is not a real Windows component. The file also has a forged ESET Management Agent version resource, and loads via side-loading into ERAAgent.exe, the Windows executable for ESET Management Agent. After confirming that its host process is named ERAAgent.exe, Sleepwalker goes to sleep inside the computer's memory, which also helps it remain hidden from traditional anti-virus tools.
Unlike most backdoors, which call back to an attacker-controlled command-and-control (C2) server and start receiving commands, Sleepwalker lies in wait, checking every packet that passes through the network looking for a specific pattern - this is called a magic packet. Once it sniffs out a packet that matches the exact pattern, the backdoor decrypts the data and treats it as a command. "Because the backdoor never sends anything out on its own and does not open any obvious listening port by default, tools that watch for connections to known-bad domains or unusual outbound traffic will not see anything unusual," Reichel wrote. "The absence of outbound connections to known-bad infrastructure does not rule out an infection, either. A machine can be fully compromised by this backdoor while producing nothing at all for a network monitor to flag."
Read more of this story at Slashdot.
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