Long-time Slashdot reader schwit1 shares a report from The Intercept: The Heat Initiative, a nonprofit child safety advocacy group, was formed earlier this year to campaign against some of the strong privacy protections Apple provides customers. The group says these protections help enable child exploitation, objecting to the fact that pedophiles can encrypt their personal data just like everyone else. When Apple launched its new iPhone this September, the Heat Initiative seized on the occasion, taking out a full-page New York Times ad, using digital billboard trucks, and even hiring a plane to fly over Apple headquarters with a banner message. The message on the banner appeared simple: 'Dear Apple, Detect Child Sexual Abuse in iCloud' -- Apple's cloud storage system, which today employs a range of powerful encryption technologies aimed at preventing hackers, spies, and Tim Cook from knowing anything about your private files. Something the Heat Initiative has not placed on giant airborne banners is who's behind it: a controversial billionaire philanthropy network whose influence and tactics have drawn unfavorable comparisons to the right-wing Koch network. Though it does not publicize this fact, the Heat Initiative is a project of the Hopewell Fund, an organization that helps privately and often secretly direct the largesse -- and political will -- of billionaires. Hopewell is part of a giant, tightly connected web of largely anonymous, Democratic Party-aligned dark-money groups, in an ironic turn, campaigning to undermine the privacy of ordinary people. For an organization demanding that Apple scour the private information of its customers, the Heat Initiative discloses extremely little about itself. According to a report in the New York Times, the Heat Initiative is armed with $2 million from donors including the Children's Investment Fund Foundation, an organization founded by British billionaire hedge fund manager and Google activist investor Chris Cohn, and the Oak Foundation, also founded by a British billionaire. The Oak Foundation previously provided $250,000 to a group attempting to weaken end-to-end encryption protections in EU legislation, according to a 2020 annual report. The Heat Initiative is helmed by Sarah Gardner, who joined from Thorn, an anti-child trafficking organization founded by actor Ashton Kutcher. [...] Critics say these technologies aren't just uncovering trafficked children, but ensnaring adults engaging in consensual sex work. "My goal is for child sexual abuse images to not be freely shared on the internet, and I'm here to advocate for the children who cannot make the case for themselves," Gardner said, declining to name the Heat Initiative's funders. "I think data privacy is vital. I think there's a conflation between user privacy and known illegal content."

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Meredith Whittaker, the president of the Signal Foundation, which maintains the nonprofit Signal messaging app, reaffirmed that Signal would leave the U.K. if the country's recently passed Online Safety Bill forced Signal to build "backdoors" into its end-to-end encryption. From a report: "We would leave the U.K. or any jurisdiction if it came down to the choice between backdooring our encryption and betraying the people who count on us for privacy, or leaving," Whittaker said. "And that's never not true." The Online Safety Bill, which was passed into law in September, includes a clause -- clause 122 -- that, depending on how it's interpreted, could allow the U.K.'s communications regulator, Ofcom, to break the encryption of apps and services under the guise of making sure illegal material such as child sexual exploitation and abuse content is removed. Ofcom could fine companies not in compliance up to $22.28 million, or 10% of their global annual revenue, under the bill -- whichever is greater. Whittaker didn't mince words in airing her fears about the Online Safety Bill's implications. "We're not about political stunts, so we're not going to just pick up our toys and go home to, like, show the bad U.K. they're being mean," she said. "We're really worried about people in the U.K. who would live under a surveillance regime like the one that seems to be teased by the Home Office and others in the U.K."

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An anonymous reader quotes a report from BleepingComputer: Google has announced the first open-source quantum resilient FIDO2 security key implementation, which uses a unique ECC/Dilithium hybrid signature schema co-created with ETH Zurich. FIDO2 is the second major version of the Fast IDentity Online authentication standard, and FIDO2 keys are used for passwordless authentication and as a multi-factor authentication (MFA) element. Google explains that a quantum-resistant FIDO2 security key implementation is a crucial step towards ensuring safety and security as the advent of quantum computing approaches and developments in the field follow an accelerating trajectory. To protect against quantum computers, a new hybrid algorithm was created by combining the established ECDSA algorithm with the Dilithium algorithm. Dilithium is a quantum-resistant cryptographic signature scheme that NIST included in its post-quantum cryptography standardization proposals, praising its strong security and excellent performance, making it suitable for use in a wide array of applications. This hybrid signature approach that blends classic and quantum-resistant features wasn't simple to manifest, Google says. Designing a Dilithium implementation that's compact enough for security keys was incredibly challenging. Its engineers, however, managed to develop a Rust-based implementation that only needs 20KB of memory, making the endeavor practically possible, while they also noted its high-performance potential. The hybrid signature schema was first presented in a 2022 paper (PDF) and recently gained recognition at the ACNS (Applied Cryptography and Network Security) 2023, where it won the "best workshop paper" award. This new hybrid implementation is now part of the OpenSK, Google's open-source security keys implementation that supports the FIDO U2F and FIDO2 standards. The tech giant hopes that its proposal will be adopted by FIDO2 as a new standard and supported by major web browsers with large user bases. The firm calls the application of next-gen cryptography at the internet scale "a massive undertaking" and urges all stakeholders to move quickly to maintain good progress on that front.

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"Teams across Google are working hard to prepare the web for the migration to quantum-resistant cryptography," writes Chrome's technical program manager for security, Devon O'Brien. "Continuing with our strategy for handling this major transition, we are updating technical standards, testing and deploying new quantum-resistant algorithms, and working with the broader ecosystem to help ensure this effort is a success." As a step down this path, Chrome will begin supporting X25519Kyber768 for establishing symmetric secrets in TLS, starting in Chrome 116, and available behind a flag in Chrome 115. This hybrid mechanism combines the output of two cryptographic algorithms to create the session key used to encrypt the bulk of the TLS connection: X25519 — an elliptic curve algorithm widely used for key agreement in TLS today Kyber-768 — a quantum-resistant Key Encapsulation Method, and NIST's PQC winner for general encryption In order to identify ecosystem incompatibilities with this change, we are rolling this out to Chrome and to Google servers, over both TCP and QUIC and monitoring for possible compatibility issues. Chrome may also use this updated key agreement when connecting to third-party server operators, such as Cloudflare, as they add support. If you are a developer or administrator experiencing an issue that you believe is caused by this change, please file a bug. The Register delves into Chrome's reasons for implementing this now: "It's believed that quantum computers that can break modern classical cryptography won't arrive for 5, 10, possibly even 50 years from now, so why is it important to start protecting traffic today?" said O'Brien. "The answer is that certain uses of cryptography are vulnerable to a type of attack called Harvest Now, Decrypt Later, in which data is collected and stored today and later decrypted once cryptanalysis improves." O'Brien says that while symmetric encryption algorithms used to defend data traveling on networks are considered safe from quantum cryptanalysis, the way the keys get negotiated is not. By adding support for a hybrid KEM, Chrome should provide a stronger defense against future quantum attacks... Rebecca Krauthamer, co-founder and chief product officer at QuSecure, told The Register in an email that while this technology sounds futuristic, it's useful and necessary today... [T]he arrival of capable quantum computers should not be thought of as a specific, looming date, but as something that will arrive without warning. "There was no press release when the team at Bletchley Park cracked the Enigma code, either," she said.

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Speaking of SMSes, Google announced today it's making its Messages by Google app more secure with improvements to RCS, or Rich Communication Services -- a protocol aimed at replacing SMS and is more on par with the advanced features found in Apple's iMessage. From a report: The company says it will now make RCS the default for both new and existing Messages app users. In addition, end-to-end encryption for group chats is now fully rolled out to all RCS users. The latter had launched into an open beta earlier this year after earlier tests, but was not fully launched until now. With this update, all conversations between users in Messages, whether 1:1 or group chats, will now be kept private, Google says. Since rolling out RCS to U.S. Android users in 2019, Google has been campaigning in an effort to pressure Apple into adopting the technology in its own messaging service, iMessage. It even launched a website last year to explain why RCS benefits consumers, noting "It's not about the color of the bubbles. It's the blurry videos, broken group chats, missing read receipts and typing indicators, no texting over Wi-Fi and more."

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Federal regulators continued their crackdown against employees of Wall Street firms using private messaging apps to communicate, with 11 brokerage firms and investment advisers agreeing Tuesday to pay $549 million in fines. From a report: Wells Fargo, BNP Paribas, Societe Generale and Bank of Montreal were hit with the biggest penalties by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Together, the brokerage and investment advisory arms of those four financial institutions accounted for nearly 90 percent of the fines, according to statements released by the regulators. The latest round of fines adds to the nearly $2 billion in penalties against big Wall Street banks announced last year for similar violations. In all, the regulators have now penalized more than two dozen banks and investment firms for not properly policing employees use of "off channel" messaging services like WhatsApp, iMessage and Signal. The S.E.C. charged the financial institutions for failing to properly "maintain and preserve" all official communications by their employees. Federal securities laws require banks and investments firms to maintain records and make sure their employees are not conducting company business using unauthorized means of communication.

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For storing passwords, Slashdot reader eggegick has a simple, easy solution: "I use Vim to keep my passwords in an encrypted file." But what's the easiest solution for people who don't use Vim? My wife is not a Linux geek like I am, so she's using [free and open-source] KeePass. It's relatively simple to install and use, but I seem to recall it used to be even much simpler... Does anybody know of a really simple password manager or encrypting notepad? I've looked at a number of them, and they use Java or Javascript, or they involve an external web site, or they have way too many features, or they use an installation program. Or Windows Defender objects to them. Share your own suggestions and thoughts in the comments. What's the best (encrypted) password manager?

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Once known for distributing hacking tools and shaming software companies into improving their security, a famed group of technology activists is now working to develop a system that will allow the creation of messaging and social networking apps that won't keep hold of users' personal data. From a report: The group, Cult of the Dead Cow, has developed a coding framework that can be used by app developers who are willing to embrace strong encryption and forsake revenue from advertising that is targeted to individuals based on detailed profiles gleaned from the data most apps now routinely collect. The team is building on the work of such free products as Signal, which offers strong encryption for text messages and voice calls, and Tor, which offers anonymous web surfing by routing traffic through a series of servers to disguise the location of the person conducting the search. The latest effort, to be detailed at the massive annual Def Con hacking conference in Las Vegas next week, seeks to provide a foundation for messaging, file sharing and even social networking apps without harvesting any data, all secured by the kind of end-to-end encryption that makes interception hard even for governments. Called Veilid, and pronounced vay-lid, the code can be used by developers to build applications for mobile devices or the web. Those apps will pass fully encrypted content to one another using the Veilid protocol, its developers say. As with the file-sharing software BitTorrent, which distributes different pieces of the same content simultaneously, the network will get faster as more devices join and share the load, the developers say. In such decentralized "peer-to-peer" networks, users download data from each other instead of from a central machine.

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Google today announced its support for interoperable end-to-end encrypted communication between large messaging platforms, with plans to integrate the MLS protocol into Google Messages and Android. 9to5Google reports: Google says it is "strongly supportive of regulatory efforts that require interoperability for large end-to-end messaging platforms," which is presumably in reference to the European Union's Digital Markets Act. That regulation would require iMessage to be interoperable with other messaging platforms. To achieve this, Google says this interoperability requires "open, industry-vetted standards, particularly in the area of privacy, security, and end-to-end encryption." If not, end-to-end encrypted group messaging and other advanced features would be "impossible in practice." Specifically, "group messages would have to be encrypted and delivered multiple times to cater for every different protocol." [...] Google says MLS would make possible "practical interoperability across services and platforms, scaling to groups of thousands of multi-device users." This could "unleash a huge field of new opportunities for the users and developers of interoperable messaging services that adopt it."; It is also flexible enough to allow providers to address emerging threats to user privacy and security, such as quantum computing. Google plans to build MLS into its Messages app, which offers E2EE 1:1 and group RCS chats today, and "support its wide deployment across the industry by open sourcing our implementation in the Android codebase." How RCS factors into this remains to be seen.

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Apple says it will remove services such as FaceTime and iMessage from the UK rather than weaken security if new proposals are made law and acted upon. From a report: The government is seeking to update the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016. It wants messaging services to clear security features with the Home Office before releasing them to customers. The act lets the Home Office demand security features are disabled, without telling the public. Under the update, this would have to be immediate. Currently, there has to be a review, there can also be an independent oversight process and a technology company can appeal before taking any action. Because of the secrecy surrounding these demands, little is known about how many have been issued and whether they have been complied with. But many messaging services currently offer end-to-end encryption - so messages can be unscrambled by only the devices sending and receiving them.

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A bill requiring social media companies, encrypted communications providers and other online services to report drug activity on their platforms to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) advanced to the Senate floor Thursday, alarming privacy advocates who say the legislation turns the companies into de facto drug enforcement agents and exposes many of them to liability for providing end-to-end encryption. From a report: The bipartisan Cooper Davis Act -- named for a Kansas teenager who died after unknowingly taking a fentanyl-laced pill he bought on Snapchat -- requires social media companies and other web communication providers to give the DEA users' names and other information when the companies have "actual knowledge" that illicit drugs are being distributed on their platforms. Many privacy advocates caution that, if passed in its current form, the bill could be a death blow to end-to-end encryption services because it includes particularly controversial language holding companies accountable for conduct they don't report if they "deliberately blind" themselves to the violations. Officials from the DEA have spent several months honing the bill with key senators, Judiciary Committee Chairman Dick Durbin (D-IL) said Thursday. Providers of encrypted services would face a difficult choice should the bill pass, said Greg Nojeim, Senior Counsel & Director of Security and Surveillance Project at the Center for Democracy and Technology. "They could maintain end-to-end encryption and risk liability that they had willfully blinded themselves to illegal content on their service and face the music later," Nojeim said. "Or they could opt to remove end-to-end encryption and subject all of their users who used to be protected by one of the best cybersecurity tools available to new threats and new privacy violations."

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An anonymous reader quotes a report from MacRumors: The macOS Sonoma update that is in testing allows Mac owners who opt to use Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, or another browser to use Apple's Password Manager for filling passwords. Developers and public beta testers running macOS Sonoma can use their iCloud Keychain passwords with non-Safari browsers at this time, autofilling passwords and one-time codes. Third-party browsers can also save new passwords. Apple has made an iCloud Passwords Chrome extension available for macOS Sonoma users, and it can be downloaded and installed to access Apple passwords on the Chrome browser or any Chromium-based browser. Apple plans to release a similar extension for the Microsoft Edge browser in the near future. Google and other browser developers are also working on implementing support for Passkeys, the password alternative that Apple introduced last year.

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An anonymous reader quotes a report from TechCrunch: Nearly 70 IT security and privacy academics have added to the clamor of alarm over the damage the U.K.'s Online Safety Bill could wreak to, er, online safety unless it's amended to ensure it does not undermine strong encryption. Writing in an open letter (PDF), 68 U.K.-affiliated security and privacy researchers have warned the draft legislation poses a stark risk to essential security technologies that are routinely used to keep digital communications safe. "As independent information security and cryptography researchers, we build technologies that keep people safe online. It is in this capacity that we see the need to stress that the safety provided by these essential technologies is now under threat in the Online Safety Bill," the academics warn, echoing concerns already expressed by end-to-end encrypted comms services such as WhatsApp, Signal and Element -- which have said they would opt to withdraw services from the market or be blocked by U.K. authorities rather than compromise the level of security provided to their users. [...] "We understand that this is a critical time for the Online Safety Bill, as it is being discussed in the House of Lords before being returned to the Commons this summer," they write. "In brief, our concern is that surveillance technologies are deployed in the spirit of providing online safety. This act undermines privacy guarantees and, indeed, safety online." The academics, who hold professorships and other positions at universities around the country -- including a number of Russell Group research-intensive institutions such as King's College and Imperial College in London, Oxford and Cambridge, Edinburgh, Sheffield and Manchester to name a few -- say their aim with the letter is to highlight "alarming misunderstandings and misconceptions around the Online Safety Bill and its interaction with the privacy and security technologies that our daily online interactions and communication rely on." "There is no technological solution to the contradiction inherent in both keeping information confidential from third parties and sharing that same information with third parties," the experts warn, adding: "The history of 'no one but us' cryptographic backdoors is a history of failures, from the Clipper chip to DualEC. All technological solutions being put forward share that they give a third party access to private speech, messages and images under some criteria defined by that third party." Last week, Apple publicly voiced its opposition to the bill. The company said in a statement: "End-to-end encryption is a critical capability that protects the privacy of journalists, human rights activists, and diplomats. It also helps everyday citizens defend themselves from surveillance, identity theft, fraud, and data breaches. The Online Safety Bill poses a serious threat to this protection, and could put UK citizens at greater risk. Apple urges the government to amend the bill to protect strong end-to-end encryption for the benefit of all."

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Apple has criticised powers in the UK's Online Safety Bill that could be used to force encrypted messaging tools like iMessage, WhatsApp and Signal to scan messages for child abuse material. From a report: Its intervention comes as 80 organisations and tech experts have written to Technology Minister Chloe Smith urging a rethink on the powers. Apple told the BBC the bill should be amended to protect encryption. End-to-end encryption (E2EE) stops anyone but the sender and recipient reading the message. Police, the government and some high-profile child protection charities maintain the tech -- used in apps such as WhatsApp and Apple's iMessage -- prevents law enforcement and the firms themselves from identifying the sharing of child sexual abuse material. But in a statement Apple said: "End-to-end encryption is a critical capability that protects the privacy of journalists, human rights activists, and diplomats. "It also helps everyday citizens defend themselves from surveillance, identity theft, fraud, and data breaches. The Online Safety Bill poses a serious threat to this protection, and could put UK citizens at greater risk. "Apple urges the government to amend the bill to protect strong end-to-end encryption for the benefit of all."

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Investigations triggered by the cracking of encrypted phones three years ago have so far led to more than 6,500 arrests worldwide and the seizure of hundreds of tons of drugs, French, Dutch and European Union prosecutors said Tuesday. From a report: The announcement underscored the staggering scale of criminality -- mainly drugs and arms smuggling and money laundering -- that was uncovered as a result of police and prosecutors effectively listening in to criminals using encrypted EncroChat phones. "It helped to prevent violent attacks, attempted murders, corruption and large-scale drug transports, as well as obtain large-scale information on organised crime," European Union police and judicial cooperation agencies Europol and Eurojust said in a statement. The French and Dutch investigation gained access to more than 115 million encrypted communications between some 60,000 criminals via servers in the northern French town of Roubaix, prosecutors said at a news conference in the nearby city of Lille. As a result, 6,558 suspects have been arrested worldwide, including 197 "high-value targets." Seized drugs included 30.5 million pills, 103.5 metric tons (114 tons) of cocaine, 163.4 metric tons (180 tons) of cannabis and 3.3 metric tons (3.6 tons) of heroin. The investigations also led to nearly 740 million euros ($809 million) in cash being recovered and assets or bank accounts worth another 154 million euros ($168 million) frozen.

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New submitter ole_timer shares a report from Wired: TikTok to Huawei routers to DJI drones, rising tensions between China and the US have made Americans -- and the US government -- increasingly wary of Chinese-owned technologies. But thanks to the complexity of the hardware supply chain, encryption chips sold by the subsidiary of a company specifically flagged in warnings from the US Department of Commerce for its ties to the Chinese military have found their way into the storage hardware of military and intelligence networks across the West. In July of 2021, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security added the Hangzhou, China-based encryption chip manufacturer Hualan Microelectronics, also known as Sage Microelectronics, to its so-called "Entity List," a vaguely named trade restrictions list that highlights companies "acting contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States." Specifically, the bureau noted that Hualan had been added to the list for "acquiring and ... attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of military modernization for [China's] People's Liberation Army." Yet nearly two years later, Hualan -- and in particular its subsidiary known as Initio, a company originally headquartered in Taiwan that it acquired in 2016 -- still supplies encryption microcontroller chips to Western manufacturers of encrypted hard drives, including several that list as customers on their websites Western governments' aerospace, military, and intelligence agencies: NASA, NATO, and the US and UK militaries. Federal procurement records show that US government agencies from the Federal Aviation Administration to the Drug Enforcement Administration to the US Navy have bought encrypted hard drives that use the chips, too. The disconnect between the Commerce Department's warnings and Western government customers means that chips sold by Hualan's subsidiary have ended up deep inside sensitive Western information networks, perhaps due to the ambiguity of their Initio branding and its Taiwanese origin prior to 2016. The chip vendor's Chinese ownership has raised fears among security researchers and China-focused national security analysts that they could have a hidden backdoor that would allow China's government to stealthily decrypt Western agencies' secrets. And while no such backdoor has been found, security researchers warn that if one did exist, it would be virtually impossible to detect it. "If a company is on the Entity List with a specific warning like this one, it's because the US government says this company is actively supporting another country's military development," says Dakota Cary, a China-focused research fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington, DC-based think tank. "It's saying you should not be purchasing from them, not just because the money you're spending is going to a company that will use those proceeds in the furtherance of another country's military objectives, but because you can't trust the product." [...] The mere fact that so many Western government agencies are buying products that include chips sold by the subsidiary of a company on the Commerce Department's trade restrictions list points to the complexities of navigating the computing hardware supply chain, says the Atlantic Council's Cary. "At minimum, it's a real oversight. Organizations that should be prioritizing this level of security are apparently not able to do so, or are making mistakes that have allowed for these products to get into their environments," he says. "It seems very significant. And it's probably not a one-off mistake."

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An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Researchers have devised a novel attack that recovers the secret encryption keys stored in smart cards and smartphones by using cameras in iPhones or commercial surveillance systems to video record power LEDs that show when the card reader or smartphone is turned on. The attacks enable a new way to exploit two previously disclosed side channels, a class of attack that measures physical effects that leak from a device as it performs a cryptographic operation. By carefully monitoring characteristics such as power consumption, sound, electromagnetic emissions, or the amount of time it takes for an operation to occur, attackers can assemble enough information to recover secret keys that underpin the security and confidentiality of a cryptographic algorithm. [...] On Tuesday, academic researchers unveiled new research demonstrating attacks that provide a novel way to exploit these types of side channels. The first attack uses an Internet-connected surveillance camera to take a high-speed video of the power LED on a smart card reader -- or of an attached peripheral device -- during cryptographic operations. This technique allowed the researchers to pull a 256-bit ECDSA key off the same government-approved smart card used in Minerva. The other allowed the researchers to recover the private SIKE key of a Samsung Galaxy S8 phone by training the camera of an iPhone 13 on the power LED of a USB speaker connected to the handset, in a similar way to how Hertzbleed pulled SIKE keys off Intel and AMD CPUs. Power LEDs are designed to indicate when a device is turned on. They typically cast a blue or violet light that varies in brightness and color depending on the power consumption of the device they are connected to. There are limitations to both attacks that make them unfeasible in many (but not all) real-world scenarios (more on that later). Despite this, the published research is groundbreaking because it provides an entirely new way to facilitate side-channel attacks. Not only that, but the new method removes the biggest barrier holding back previously existing methods from exploiting side channels: the need to have instruments such as an oscilloscope, electric probes, or other objects touching or being in proximity to the device being attacked. In Minerva's case, the device hosting the smart card reader had to be compromised for researchers to collect precise-enough measurements. Hertzbleed, by contrast, didn't rely on a compromised device but instead took 18 days of constant interaction with the vulnerable device to recover the private SIKE key. To attack many other side channels, such as the one in the World War II encrypted teletype terminal, attackers must have specialized and often expensive instruments attached or near the targeted device. The video-based attacks presented on Tuesday reduce or completely eliminate such requirements. All that's required to steal the private key stored on the smart card is an Internet-connected surveillance camera that can be as far as 62 feet away from the targeted reader. The side-channel attack on the Samsung Galaxy handset can be performed by an iPhone 13 camera that's already present in the same room. Videos here and here show the video-capture process of a smart card reader and a Samsung Galaxy phone, respectively, as they perform cryptographic operations. "To the naked eye, the captured video looks unremarkable," adds Ars. "But by analyzing the video frames for different RGB values in the green channel, an attacker can identify the start and finish of a cryptographic operation."

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An anonymous reader quotes a report from Wired: Spain has advocated banning encryption for hundreds of millions of people within the European Union, according to a leaked document obtained by WIRED that reveals strong support among EU member states for proposals to scan private messages for illegal content. The document, a European Council survey of member countries' views on encryption regulation, offered officials' behind-the-scenes opinions on how to craft a highly controversial law to stop the spread of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) in Europe. The proposed law would require tech companies to scan their platforms, including users' private messages, to find illegal material. However, the proposal from Ylva Johansson, the EU commissioner in charge of home affairs, has drawn ire from cryptographers, technologists, and privacy advocates for its potential impact on end-to-end encryption. For years, EU states have debated whether end-to-end encrypted communication platforms, such as WhatsApp and Signal, should be protected as a way for Europeans to exercise a fundamental right to privacy -- or weakened to keep criminals from being able to communicate outside the reach of law enforcement. Experts who reviewed the document at WIRED's request say it provides important insight into which EU countries plan to support a proposal that threatens to reshape encryption and the future of online privacy. Of the 20 EU countries represented in the document leaked to WIRED, the majority said they are in favor of some form of scanning of encrypted messages, with Spain's position emerging as the most extreme. "Ideally, in our view, it would be desirable to legislatively prevent EU-based service providers from implementing end-to-end encryption," Spanish representatives said in the document. The source of the document declined to comment and requested anonymity because they were not authorized to share it. In its response, Spain said it is "imperative that we have access to the data" and suggests that it should be possible for encrypted communications to be decrypted. Spain's interior minister, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, has been outspoken about what he considers the threat posted by encryption. When reached for comment about the leaked document, Daniel Campos de Diego, a spokesperson for Spain's Ministry of Interior, says the country's position on this matter is widely known and has been publicly disseminated on several occasions. Edging close to Spain, Poland advocated in the leaked document for mechanisms through which encryption could be lifted by court order and for parents to have the power to decrypt children's communications. Several other countries say they would give law enforcement access to people's encrypted messages and communications. "Cyprus, Hungary, and Spain very clearly see this law as their opportunity to get inside encryption to undermine encrypted communications, and that to me is huge," says Ella Jakubowska, a senior policy advisor at European Digital Rights (EDRI) who reviewed the document. "They are seeing this law is going far beyond what DG home is claiming that it's there for."

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An anonymous reader shares an excerpt from a collaborative investigation between Motherboard, lavialibera, and IrpiMedia: Mafioso Bartolo Bruzzaniti needed everyone to do their job just right. First, the Colombian suppliers would hide a massive amount of cocaine inside bananas at the port city of Turbo, Colombia. That shipping container would then be transported across the ocean to Catania, in Sicily, Italy. A corrupt port worker on the mafia's payroll would wave the shipment through and had advised the group how to package the drugs. This was so the cocaine could remain undetected even if the worker was forced to scan the shipment. Another group of on-the-ground mafiosos would then unload the cocaine outside of the port. In March 2021, Bruzzaniti, an alleged member of the infamous 'Ndrangheta mafia group and who says Milan belongs to him "by right," asked his brother Antonio to go fetch something else crucial to the traffickers' success. "Go right now," Bruzzaniti wrote in a text message later produced in court records. "It's needed urgently." Investigators know what Bruzzaniti said because European authorities had penetrated an encrypted phone network called Sky and harvested around a billion of the users' messages. These phones are the technological backbone of organized crime around the world. The thing Antonio needed to urgently fetch was a phone from a different encrypted phone network, one that the authorities appear to have not compromised and which the mafia have been using as part of their operations. To that phone, a contact sent one half of the shipping container's serial number. A reporting collaboration between Motherboard, lavialibera, and IrpiMedia has identified that encrypted phone as being run by a company called No. 1 Business Communication (No. 1 BC). The investigation has found members of the mafia and other organized crime groups turning to No. 1 BC as authorities cracked down on other platforms. The collaboration has identified multiple key players in No. 1 BC's development, sales, and legal structure. "Take the bc1 right away," Bruzzaniti wrote in another text, referring to the No. 1 BC phone.

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After security researchers criticized Google for not including end-to-end encryption with Authenticator's account-syncing update, the company announced "plans to offer E2EE" in the future. "Right now, we believe that our current product strikes the right balance for most users and provides significant benefits over offline use," writes Google product manager Christiaan Brand on Twitter. "However, the option to use the app offline will remain an alternative for those who prefer to manage their backup strategy themselves." The Verge reports: Earlier this week, Google Authenticator finally started giving users the option to sync two-factor authentication codes with their Google accounts, making it much easier to sign into accounts on new devices. While this is a welcome change, it also poses some security concerns, as hackers who break into someone's Google account could potentially gain access to a trove of other accounts as a result. If the feature supported E2EE, hackers and other third parties, including Google, wouldn't be able to see this information. Security researchers Mysk highlighted some of these risks in a post on Twitter, noting that "if there's ever a data breach or if someone obtains access to your Google Account, all of your 2FA secrets would be compromised." They added that Google could potentially use the information linked to your accounts to serve personalized ads and also advised users not to use the syncing feature until it supports E2EE. Brand pushed back against the criticism, stating that while Google encrypts "data in transit, and at rest, across our products, including in Google Authenticator," applying E2EE comes at the "cost of enabling users to get locked out of their own data without recovery."

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